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FOREWORD
PRO SE PRISONER LITIGATION:
LOOKING FOR NEEDLES IN HAYSTACKS"
Hon. Jon 0. Newman'
In recent years, the fastest growing category of civil litigation in
federal district courts has been prisoner lawsuits. Though some of
these suits are habeas corpus challenges to convictions, the vast
majority are challenges to various aspects of the conditions of
confinement. In 1995, what the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts categorizes as "civil rights" petitions by prisoners
totaled 41,679, thirteen percent of all civil cases in district courts.'
Prisoner lawsuits challenging prison conditions share two
characteristics. Nearly all of these lawsuits are filed pro se, and the
vast majority are dismissed as frivolous. However, among this
growing number of frivolous lawsuits are a small number of serious
matters that pose substantial issues, and a few of these serious
lawsuits have resulted in significant victories.2
01996 Jon 0. Newman. All Rights Reserved.
'Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. This article is
an expanded version of a commencement address delivered at the 1995
commencement of Brooklyn Law School1 LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, JuDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 139 (1995).
2 See, e-g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (upholding right of
prisoner not to be deliberately subjected to second-hand tobacco smoke); Hudson v.
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It should come as no surprise that the burden of the vast
number of frivolous prisoner suits has created hostility to the entire
category of lawsuits-opposition that has the potential of obscuring
the few meritorious prisoner lawsuits which are about as scarce as
the proverbial needle in the haystack. I propose to consider (1) the
often exaggerated responses of the state attorneys general to prisoner
lawsuits, (2) the more sensible congressional approach of limiting
prisoner lawsuits by imposing obligations to pay filing fees, and (3)
the initial appellate decisions of the Second Circuit applying the fee
provision of the new statute.
I. EXAGGERATIONS FROM THE STATE ArORNEYS GENERAL
Laboring under the burdens of having to respond to thousands
of lawsuits, most of which are frivolous, the attorneys general of the
states adopted the tactic of condemning all prisoner litigation as
frivolous. Their national association canvassed the attorneys general
for their lists of top ten frivolous prisoner lawsuits and widely dis-
seminated to the press the lists the association collected.3
Unfortunately, the lists included some accounts that were at
best highly misleading and, sometimes, simply false. Three examples
were cited in a letter by four attorneys general that was published in
the New York Times on March 3, 1995.4 Three cases, described as
"typical," were reported in the following words:
* the inmate who sued because there were no salad bars or brunches
on weekends and holidays;
* the case where a prisoner is suing New York because his prison
towels are white instead of his preferred beige; and
* the case where an inmate sued, claiming cruel and unusual pun-
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (upholding prisoner's claim of use of excessive force);
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (barring involuntary transfer of prisoner to
mental hospital without procedural due process); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974) (requiring procedural due process protections for prison disciplinary
proceedings); Fisher v. Koehler, 902 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1990) (unconstitutional
conditions at local jail); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974)
(unconstitutional conditions at local jail); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1971) (in banc) (unlawful to impose segregated confinement because of political
beliefs), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972), and 405 U.S. 978 (1972); see generally
Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 639 (1993).
3 Attorneys General Seek to Curtail Frivolous Inmate Lawsuits; Call Upon U.S.
Congress, States Legislatures to Respond, NEWS RELEASE (Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys
Gen., Washington, D.C.), Aug. 1, 1995.
' Dennis C. Vacco et al., Letter to the Editor, Free the Courts from Frivolous
Prisoner Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at A3.
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ishment because he received one jar of chunky and one jar of creamy
peanut butter after ordering two jars of chunky from the prison
canteen.
I was skeptical of the description of these three cases be-
cause it has not been my experience in twenty-four years as a
federal judge that what the attorneys general described was at
all "typical" of prisoner litigation. I obtained the court docu-
ments on these three cases and learned the following. In the
"salad bar" case, forty-three prisoners filed a twenty-seven
page complaint alleging major prison deficiencies including
overcrowding, forced confinement of prisoners with contagious
diseases, lack of proper ventilation, lack of sufficient food, and
food contaminated by rodents.' The prisoners' reference to
salads was part of an allegation that their basic nutritional
needs were not being met, and they mentioned, in passing,
that at their prison a salad bar is available to prison guards
and, at other state prisons, is available to prisoners. The com-
plaint concerned dangerously unhealthy prison conditions, not
the lack of a salad bar.
In the "beige towel" case, the suit was not brought because
of a color preference. The prisoner's claim was that the prison
had confiscated the towels and a jacket that the prisoner's
family had sent him, and then disciplined him with loss of
privileges for receipt of the package from his family. As he
stated, the confiscation "cause[d] a burden on my family who
work hard and had to make sacrifices to buy me the items
mention[edl in this claim.
In the "chunky peanut butter" case, the prisoner did not
sue because he received the wrong kind of peanut butter. He
sued because the prison had incorrectly debited his prison
account $2.50 under the following circumstances. He had or-
dered two jars of peanut butter; one sent by the canteen was
the wrong kind, and a guard had quite willingly taken back
the wrong product and assured the prisoner that the item he
had ordered and paid for would be sent the next day. Unfortu-
nately, the authorities transferred the prisoner that night to
another prison, and his prison account remained charged $2.50
for the item that he had ordered but had never received.
Tyler v. Carnahan, No. 4 94 CV 0017WSB (E.D. Mo. filed Dec. 17, 1993).
6 Rivera v. State of New York, No. 90811 (N.Y. Ct. CL fled Dec. 21, 1994).
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The "chunky peanut butter" case has become the favorite
canard of those who wish to ridicule prisoner litigation. Many
journalists have reported it, using the inaccurate description of
the case popularized by the attorneys general.' Their mislead-
ing characterization of the case was repeatedly cited during
congressional consideration of proposals to limit prisoner litiga-
tion.8
I readily acknowledge that $2.50 is not a large sum of
money, and there is a substantial argument that lawsuits for
such sums should be relegated to forums other than federal
district courts. But such a sum is not trivial to the prisoner
whose limited prison funds are improperly debited. The more
important point is that those in positions of responsibility
should not ridicule all prisoner lawsuits by perpetuating myths
about some of them.
II. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
This year, Congress endeavored to curtail prisoner litiga-
tion by enacting the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PLRA"), signed into law on April 26, 1996.? The PLRA covers
several topics, including prospective remedies in suits chal-
lenging prison conditions and exhaustion of administrative
remedies, that are beyond the scope of this brief Article. My
focus is on the provision concerning payment of filing fees,
which Congress adopted in the expectation that prisoners
would file fewer lawsuits if they had to pay filing fees out of
their prison fund accounts.
Prior to the PLRA, most prisoners filing lawsuits accompa-
nied their complaints with a motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis.° Upon submission of an affidavit of poverty,
' See, e.g., George F. Will, 1995: Oh, A Revolution, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 25,
1995/Jan. 1, 1996, at 136.
' See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S3, 703-01 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Abraham); id. at S2, 219-03 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Reid); 141 CONG. REC. S14, 626-1 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Dole); id. at S14, 418-01 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl); id. at
H1, 480-06 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1995) (statement of Rep. Canady).
' The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 is Title VIII of the Omnibus Con-
solidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110
Stat. 1321 (1996).
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1994), as amended by Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
[Vol. 62: 519
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any litigant is entitled to file a lawsuit in a district court or an
appeal in a court of appeals without prepayment of fees." An
action brought in formna pauperis is, by statute, subject to dis-
missal if determined to be frivolous.12
The PLRA amends the in forma pauperis provision with
respect to any prisoner seeking "to bring a civil action" or "ap-
peal a judgment in a civil action."m Such prisoners are now
liable for filing fees, even though they have only the minimal
financial resources that would qualify them for in forma pau-
peris status if they were not prisoners. The fees are to be debit-
ed from the prisoner's trust fund account.14 The prisoner pays
an initial partial filing fee equal to twenty percent of the great-
er of the average monthly deposits or the average monthly
balance in the prison account for the six months prior to filing
the complaint or notice of appeal.' Thereafter, twenty percent
of the income credited to the account is debited in each month
that the account balance exceeds $10 until the balance of the
filing fees is paid. 6 The PLRA exempts only those prisoners
who have "no assets and no means by which to pay the initial
partial filing fee."'7 To implement the filing fee payment obli-
gation, the PLRA requires the prisoner to submit a certified
copy of the prisoner's trust fund account statement (or institu-
tional equivalent) for the six months preceding the complaint
or appeal.'
I. INITIAL SECOND CIRCUIT CONSIDERATION OF THE PLRA
In a series of cases decided in the summer of 1996, the
Second Circuit resolved a number of issues arising under the
fee provisions of the PLRA.' The first issue concerned the
of 1995.
* Id. § 1915(a), as amended by Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
12 Id. § 1915(d), as amended by Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
Id. § 1915(a)(2). as amended by Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
14 Id. § 1915(b), as amended by Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
,5 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), as amended by Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of
1995.
16 Id. § 1915(b)(2), as amended by Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
17 Id. § 1915(b)(4), as amended by Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
Id. § 1915(a)(2), as amended by Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
, Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Nagy, 89 F.3d 115 (2d
Cir. 1996); Covino v. Reopel, 89 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 1996); Leonard v. Lacy, 88 F.3d
1996]
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mechanics of complying with the new statute. The PLRA states
that the prisoner shall file the certified copy of the prison trust
fund account statement and that the court shall assess and
collect the initial partial filing fee payment. 0 The subsequent
payments are to be made by "[t]he agency having custody of
the prisoner."2' These provisions created essentially adminis-
trative choices as to how compliance should be achieved.
The Second Circuit devised an administrative arrangement
that simplifies the tasks of the prisoner and the court of ap-
peals, and shifts some functions to the prison authorities. In
the first decision construing the PLRA, Leonard v. Lacy,22 the
Second Circuit created a prisoner authorization form to be
used by every prisoner endeavoring to appeal in forma paupe-
ris. Using this form, the prisoner authorizes the prison au-
thorities to send to the court of appeals the certified copy of
the prisoner's prison account and all of the payments required
by the PLRA. The court considered the use of the authorization
form to be compliance with the statutory requirements on the
theory that requiring the form "causes" submission of the ac-
count statement by the prisoner and collection by the court of
the initial payment.'
The authorization form eliminates potential disputes be-
tween the prisoner and the prison concerning the availability
of the prison account statement, and potential disputes be-
tween the court and the prison concerning the initial payment.
The authorization form procedure centralizes, all steps to im-
plement the fee payment requirements in the prison authori-
ties, once the prisoner has signed the required authorization.
Submission of a signed authorization form is a requirement of
proceeding with an appeal without prepayment of fees. If the
form is not submitted within thirty days of filing the appeal,
the appeal is dismissed.'
181 (2d Cir. 1996).
20 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), (b)(1), as amended by Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
of 1995.
21 Id. § 1915(b)(2), as amended by Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
2 88 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 1996).
' See id. at 187 n.3.
24 Id. at 187.
25 Id.
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Leonard also resolved an important issue concerning the
time at which the prisoner becomes obligated for fee debits
from the prison account. Prior to the PLRA, it had been the
practice of the Second Circuit, upon consideration of any pro se
litigant's motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, to make
a threshold determination of whether the appeal surmounted
the "frivolousness" standard of section 1915(d). In scores of
cases, the court determined that the appeal was frivolous and
for that reason denied the motion to appeal in forma pauperis
and simultaneously dismissed the appeal. This procedure fol-
lowed the Supreme Court's guidance in Neitzke v. Williams.'
With enactment of the PLRA, the Second Circuit faced the
choice of whether to impose the fee payment obligation as soon
as the notice of appeal is received or only after the threshold
determination that the appeal surmounts the "frivolousness"
standard. If "frivolousness" were determined first and frivolous
appeals were dismissed before the fee obligation was imposed,
the PLRA would have the perverse effect of letting prisoners
with frivolous appeals avoid the fee payment obligation and
imposing the obligation only on those whose appeals were not
frivolous. The court therefore concluded that the fee payment
obligation must be imposed at the outset of the appeal, thereby
implementing the congressional objective of making prisoners
feel the deterrent effect of liability for fees.'
The court also resolved issues concerning the application
of the PLRA to pending appeals. In Covino v. Reopel,' the
court ruled that the PLRA fee requirements applied to prison-
ers who, before the effective date of the Act, had filed notices of
appeal, had moved for leave to appeal in forma pauperis,'
or had acquired in forima pauperis status on appeal by virtue of
having such status unrevoked in the district court.3 ' The
PLRA fee requirements do not apply to such cases, however, if
26 490 U.S. 319 (1989).
' Leonard, 88 F.3d at 185.
23 89 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 1996).
Id. at 108 (Coviao and Vann).
"Id. (Kellams).
31 Id (David); see Fed. P. App. P. 24(a).
1996]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
the court has already invested substantial resources in the ap-
peal, 2 or if the appeal was submitted before the effective date
of the PLRA."3
The court also determined the amount of appellate fees to
which the fee payment obligation applies. Though the only fee
denominated by statute as an appellate filing fee is the $5 fee
imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1917, the court ruled in Leonard that
the fee obligation applied to both the $5 fee and the $100 dock-
eting fee required by resolution of the Judicial Conference of
the United States,' acting pursuant to its authority to deter-
mine "[t]he fees and costs to be charged and collected in each
court of appeals."35
Finally, the court resolved two issues concerning the appli-
cability of the fee payment obligation. In In re Nagy,36 the
court ruled that the PLRA requirements apply to mandamus
petitions that seek relief from prison officials comparable to
the relief usually sought in civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, but did not apply to mandamus petitions seeking relief
against judges in the course of criminal proceedings. Of more
significance was the ruling in Reyes v. Keane,37 that the PLRA
fee requirements do not apply to appeals from the denial of
habeas corpus petitions.
CONCLUSION
Pro se prisoner lawsuits and appeals will very likely con-
tinue to impose significant burdens on federal district courts
and courts of appeals. Prisoners who are subject to governmen-
tal authority twenty-four hours a day will inevitably encounter
some actions they consider worthy of legal redress, and they
have ample time to devote to the task of preparing their court
82 Covino, 89 F.3d at 106.
's Ramsey v. Coughlin, 94 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 1996); see Duamutef v. O'Keefe, No.
96-2238, slip op. at 105, 108 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 1996) (PLRA inapplicable where
notice of appeal filed before effective date of PLRA, briefs filed after effective date
but before decision in Covino.)
34 See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 12 (March 17, 1987).
2' 28 U.S.C. § 1913 (1994), as amended by Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of
1995; see Leonard v. Lacy, 88 F.3d 181, 186 (2d Cir. 1994).
36 89 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1996).
3, 90 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 1996).
[Vol. 62: 619
PRO SE PRISONER LITIGATION
papers. The challenge for courts is to avoid letting the large
number of frivolous complaints and appeals impair their con-
scientious consideration of the few meritorious cases that are
filed.
Whether the new fee obligations of the PLRA will deter
some prisoners from filing complaints and appeals remains to
be seen. My guess is that some prisoners will think twice be-
fore subjecting the limited funds in their prison accounts to
debiting of the $120 fee for filing a complaint and the $105
aggregate fee for filing an appeal, and some prisoners will
decide not to file.' Whatever the deterrent effect of the
PLRA, courts will continue to have the important task of look-
ing through the "haystacks" of prisoner lawsuits for the "nee-
dles" of meritorious prisoner claims.
' Of the first 38 prisoners to whom the Second Circuit sent notices of intent
to dismiss unless the authorization form for fee payments was filed within 30
days, 10 decided not to authorize fees to be debited from their prison accounts,
and their appeals were dismissed.
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